What is the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), and where does it stand now?
A dated timeline of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, U.S. withdrawal, reduced compliance and the unresolved policy dispute.

The Iran nuclear agreement is easier to understand as a sequence of commitments, withdrawals and disputes than as a single document that is either “on” or “off.”
2015, Negotiators agree on limits
Iran and the P5+1 concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July. Iran accepted limits on enrichment, its uranium stockpile and centrifuges, together with enhanced monitoring, in exchange for nuclear-related sanctions relief. The archived U.S. State Department deal page preserves the original U.S. account.
July 2015, The Security Council endorses it
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsed the agreement and established a separate UN timetable. A political agreement and a Security Council resolution are related but distinct instruments.
January 2016, Implementation begins
IAEA verification of initial steps triggered sanctions relief. The Arms Control Association’s chronology distinguishes implementation from the date negotiators signed.
May 2018, The United States withdraws
Washington left the deal and reimposed sanctions. Other participants did not all withdraw at the same moment. The loss of expected economic benefit changed Iran’s incentive to remain within the limits.
2019 onward, Iran reduces compliance
Iran progressively exceeded some nuclear limits and curtailed aspects of monitoring. The date and scope of each step matter; “Iran left the deal” blurs different legal and technical actions.
2021–2022, Revival talks stall
Negotiators explored restoring reciprocal compliance without securing a durable return. A proposal is not an operative agreement.
What the sequence leaves unresolved
The JCPOA addressed nuclear activities, not all of Iran’s regional activity or missile program. Its monitoring and time-limited provisions remain central to arguments about what a successor deal should cover.
Analysis, Mariam Khalil: Analysts differ on whether a narrow nuclear agreement is a realistic first step or an incomplete bargain that makes broader security problems harder. I would judge any new offer by its verifiable nuclear limits and the durability of sanctions relief, then assess the regional questions separately.
Read the IAEA explainer for what inspectors can verify.
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