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Boko Haram Rejects Nigerian Ceasefire, Ransom Deal in New Video

Boko Haram released a video Monday publicly rejecting a ceasefire and ransom agreement with Abuja, extending the Lake Chad Basin insurgency with no settlement in sight.

Boko Haram Rejects Nigerian Ceasefire, Ransom Deal in New Video
Photo: that_photographer / Pexels · Pexels License
By Mariam KhalilIran and Middle East correspondent·Published ·3 min read

Boko Haram publicly rejected a ceasefire and ransom deal offered by the Nigerian government in a new video released Monday, HumAngle reported, dealing a fresh blow to Abuja’s efforts to negotiate an end to one of West Africa’s longest-running insurgencies.

The outlet, which maintains close coverage of the Lake Chad Basin conflict, reported the rejection without releasing full video content at the time of this writing. Details of who spoke in the video and which specific terms were refused were not immediately available from published reporting.

That the group chose to issue the rejection publicly — through video — rather than through back-channel silence carries its own significance: the statement is directed simultaneously at the Nigerian state and at the group’s internal audience.

A Fractured Organization

Boko Haram is not a unified force. Following the 2021 death of longtime leader Abubakar Shekau, a major faction merged with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which operates under the broader Islamic State organizational umbrella and maintains a distinct command structure. A separate Boko Haram faction has continued operating under different leadership since the split.

Which faction released Monday’s video was not immediately clear from available reporting — and the distinction matters. ISWAP has, at times, shown tactical pragmatism in its dealings with civilian communities in areas it controls. The remaining Boko Haram faction has been associated with harder-line positions on negotiations and more indiscriminate violence against civilian populations.

Nigeria’s Negotiating Strategy

The Nigerian government has pursued talks with Boko Haram factions intermittently for more than a decade, cycling through military pressure, ransom payments, prisoner exchanges, and third-party mediators — including local Islamic scholars, northeastern state governors, and international organizations — to secure the release of hostages and test the possibility of a broader settlement.

The 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok became the most internationally visible episode of this pattern and accelerated global pressure on Abuja. Some abductees were subsequently returned through negotiations that reportedly involved ransom components, a model successive Nigerian governments have used selectively while officially denying direct payments.

Ceasefire talks of this kind rarely succeed on a first attempt. In past cycles, publicly rejected offers have eventually led to resumed negotiations following periods of military escalation or renewed mediation.

The Government’s Position

For President Bola Tinubu’s administration, the video is a setback at a moment when the Nigerian military has publicly claimed progress in the northeast. Sustained operations have continued in Borno State, but attacks on farming communities, abductions along rural roads, and assaults on military outposts have not ceased.

Acknowledging a formal negotiation — and seeing it publicly rejected — forces the government to reckon with the limits of a military-first approach. Families of hostages and affected communities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states have consistently pressured Abuja to continue talks regardless of setbacks.

Broader Sahel Deterioration

Monday’s development arrives as the security landscape across the wider Sahel has grown more difficult. Military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger that came to power between 2021 and 2023 expelled French forces and scaled back United Nations peacekeeping operations, creating operational space for armed groups — including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province — to expand across borders that were never effectively policed.

Nigeria has maintained civilian government and continued formal security cooperation with regional partners through the Multinational Joint Task Force, a coalition involving Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon established specifically to counter Boko Haram and ISWAP. But when Niger’s post-coup government effectively suspended cross-border cooperation in 2023, the interdiction of supply routes and escape corridors used by armed groups became substantially harder.

Ceasefire Talks Stalling Across Conflicts

The Nigerian breakdown is not isolated. In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy stated this week that Kyiv wants specific commitments from partners before agreeing to any halt in strikes — a reminder that bridging the gap between a ceasefire framework and an enforceable agreement is rarely quick even when political will exists on at least one side.

In Nigeria’s case, political will on the government’s side appears present. Whether the same is true of the Boko Haram faction that issued Monday’s video remains the core uncertainty.

What Comes Next

A public rejection does not close the door permanently. In previous cycles, returned demands have led to resumed negotiations after periods of intensified operations or after third-party actors reduced the distance between the parties’ positions.

Whether this latest breakdown leads to an escalation, an extended stalemate, or an eventual resumption of talks depends on military and political dynamics not yet fully visible in available reporting. The Tinubu administration has not issued a public response as of this writing.

The situation will be updated as additional sourced details become available.


For context on how global energy markets are responding to simultaneous pressure points from multiple conflict zones, see our coverage of oil prices and the Hormuz crisis and sanctions dynamics in the Iran-Russia axis.

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