Taiwan Presses Jakarta on Chinese Naval Exercise East of Island
Taipei is seeking an explanation after Indonesia joined China in a naval exercise east of Taiwan, a rare ASEAN alignment that sharpens pressure on the island during Han Kuang drills.
Taiwan’s government has formally asked Indonesia why Jakarta participated in a Chinese naval exercise conducted east of the island, a diplomatic inquiry that has drawn immediate attention from regional analysts who track Beijing’s effort to draw Southeast Asian partners closer to its military posture.
The Diplomat reported that Taipei’s inquiry centers on why an ASEAN member would participate in a Chinese military drill positioned to Taiwan’s east — the Pacific-facing flank that carries particular strategic weight in any conflict scenario, as it controls sea lanes connecting the island to its deepest potential lines of resupply and retreat.
No formal Indonesian government explanation had been published by the time this report was filed.
Indonesia and the ASEAN Non-Alignment Norm
Indonesia has for decades maintained a posture of non-alignment in the U.S.-China competition over Taiwan’s status. As the bloc’s most populous member and an economy that depends heavily on stable regional trade lanes, Jakarta has historically been among the more cautious ASEAN states on military questions involving the strait.
Joining a Chinese-led naval exercise in waters east of Taiwan tests that posture publicly. It also complicates Jakarta’s relationships with partners including the United States, Japan, and Australia, all of which watch ASEAN cohesion on Taiwan as a bellwether of Beijing’s regional influence.
ASEAN has no formal collective policy on Taiwan, but quiet non-participation in Chinese military drills near the island has functioned as an unspoken norm. Whether Jakarta’s decision reflects a deliberate strategic pivot, a discrete bilateral arrangement with Beijing, or a miscalculation of the diplomatic optics remains unclear.
China Dismisses Han Kuang as Theater
The Chinese naval exercise east of Taiwan unfolded simultaneously with Taiwan’s own annual Han Kuang military drills — the island’s largest-scale self-defense rehearsal. China has publicly dismissed the exercises as an “empty show” that could not deter a military operation, framing Taiwan’s defense exercises as incapable of matching PLA capabilities.
Outside analysts dispute that framing. China policy analyst Gordon Chang told Fox News that China’s military is in “no position” to invade Taiwan, citing readiness gaps and logistical constraints that would make an amphibious crossing across the strait prohibitively difficult under current conditions. The competing assessments — Beijing’s public confidence and outside skepticism of PLA readiness — illustrate how difficult it is to evaluate China’s actual invasion capability without a live conflict to benchmark against.
The Institute for the Study of War’s China & Taiwan update for August 14 tracked the week’s developments across PLA positioning, cross-strait signaling, and Chinese naval exercises.
U.S. Transit Frequency Under Scrutiny
The Indonesia episode arrives at a moment when American naval presence through the strait itself has drawn scrutiny. Breaking Defense reported this week that U.S. warships have been transiting the Taiwan Strait less frequently, prompting debate among analysts about whether reduced operational tempo signals a strategic recalibration or a reduced American commitment to freedom of navigation in the channel.
The dual picture — an ASEAN member conducting drills alongside China east of Taiwan and a quieter American surface presence through the strait — gives Beijing a narrative advantage in the ongoing signaling competition over the island’s future.
Financial Markets Register the Tension
The week’s strategic pressures around Taiwan are also registering in institutional investment decisions. Reuters reported that SoftBank has sold 71.5% of its Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company holdings, according to a new SEC filing — a significant divestment from the company at the center of global chip supply chains and, by extension, the principal commercial rationale underpinning Taiwan’s strategic importance to both Washington and Tokyo.
SoftBank has not publicly attributed the decision to cross-strait risk. The timing, however, coincides with one of the more pressured weeks for Taiwan’s security environment this year.
What to Watch
Jakarta’s response to Taipei’s inquiry — or the absence of one — will indicate how far Indonesia is willing to move toward open alignment with Chinese military activities near Taiwan. An acknowledgment that the exercise was a routine bilateral matter would read differently than silence or a denial that the participation carried any political significance.
The ISW’s ongoing China & Taiwan updates will track PLA movements as Han Kuang concludes. Whether Beijing follows the exercise east of Taiwan with further provocative maneuvers, or allows the pressure to ease as the drills wind down, will shape the near-term trajectory of cross-strait tensions.
For earlier coverage of this week’s military developments, see our reporting on Chinese and Taiwanese war games and the CENTCOM multinational drone task force announced Thursday. On the broader question of American power projection in a multi-front environment, see our piece on the U.S.-Iran Hormuz confrontation and Patriot missile license negotiations with Ukraine.
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