IAEA Set to Remove Nuclear Material From Syria in U.S.-Brokered Deal

International inspectors are preparing to remove nuclear material from a Syrian site under an arrangement mediated by Washington, according to a report by the Jerusalem Post — a development aimed at averting a potential confrontation among Israel, Syria, and Turkey at one of the region’s most volatile fault lines.

The Agreement

The reported deal would task the International Atomic Energy Agency with securing the undeclared nuclear material and removing it from Syrian territory. Syrian officials have claimed no prior knowledge of the material’s existence, according to the Jerusalem Post, a claim that raises immediate questions about inventory and chain of custody during and after the years of civil conflict that reshaped the country’s governing structures.

Details of the U.S.-brokered terms were not fully disclosed in initial reporting. The overarching goal, the Jerusalem Post indicated, is to prevent the situation from escalating into a military confrontation among three parties whose interests in Syria frequently conflict: Israel, which has conducted hundreds of airstrikes on Syrian soil over proliferation concerns; Turkey, which maintains troops and political influence across northern Syria; and Syria’s transitional government, which inherited a state with contested territorial control and unresolved weapons stockpiles.

Syria’s Nuclear History

Syria’s covert nuclear ambitions predate the current situation by nearly two decades. Israel struck a suspected reactor under construction at Al-Kibar in eastern Syria in September 2007, destroying a facility the IAEA later assessed was likely a nuclear reactor. The Assad regime never cooperated fully with subsequent IAEA investigations, leaving unanswered questions about the scope of any program that may have existed beyond that single site.

Those questions became more pressing when the Assad government collapsed in December 2024, transferring authority to a transitional administration. The change opened physical access to facilities that had been off-limits for years — including sites that current Syrian officials may have had no prior knowledge of or means to monitor.

Three Actors, Competing Interests

The deal’s urgency is shaped by the overlapping and often competing interests of the three parties involved.

Israel has demonstrated consistent willingness to act unilaterally against weapons proliferation in Syria rather than await the conclusion of diplomatic processes. Any confirmed nuclear or radiological material on Syrian soil represents an Israeli security concern that Jerusalem is unlikely to leave unaddressed indefinitely.

Turkey backs several Syrian armed factions and has forces deployed across northern Syria, giving Ankara both leverage over Damascus and a stake in the country’s stability. Turkish and Israeli interests in Syria have periodically clashed. An incident involving nuclear material — whether a unilateral Israeli strike or an attempted transfer by an armed faction — could draw Turkey into an escalation it would otherwise prefer to avoid.

The U.S. role in brokering this arrangement reflects Washington’s interest in ensuring that post-Assad Syria does not become a source of proliferation or a trigger for a regional war. That interest is particularly acute given the parallel pressures on American diplomacy: ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran, an unresolved Gaza conflict, and sustained military commitments in the broader Middle East.

IAEA Authority and Next Steps

The IAEA’s safeguards mandate authorizes inspections and verification of nuclear inventories, but the agency depends on state cooperation and access agreements. If Syria’s transitional government is actively cooperating with the removal — as the reported deal implies — the operation could proceed without requiring a formal IAEA Board of Governors referral or UN Security Council action.

What the agency removes, and where it goes, will matter as much as the act of removal. Securing material at the Syrian site under international custody is a first step; transferring it to a recognized nuclear facility for safeguarded long-term storage is the longer-term challenge that will determine whether the arrangement holds.

Wider Diplomatic Context

The nuclear material disclosure surfaces at a moment of acute regional strain. U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations remain unresolved, and Iranian-backed forces remain active across the Levant. On a separate diplomatic track, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly rejected the latest U.S.-backed Gaza ceasefire proposal, according to Foreign Policy, leaving that conflict without a near-term political resolution.

The Syria development, if confirmed and implemented, would represent one of the few recent instances in which American mediation in the Middle East produced a concrete, verifiable outcome. Whether that outcome holds will depend on sustained cooperation from all three parties — none of whom share a record of consistent coordination in Syria.

The Strait of Hormuz shipping crisis and Taiwan’s latest military preparedness exercises underscore the breadth of simultaneous flashpoints competing for U.S. diplomatic and military attention — a resource constraint that shapes how much pressure Washington can apply, and how quickly, to hold this Syrian arrangement together.