IAEA Chief Calls Iran Uranium Transfer 'Difficult but Not Impossible'

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said transferring Iran’s roughly 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to approximately 60 percent purity out of the country is “difficult but not impossible,” framing one of the central technical obstacles to any US-Iran agreement as a solvable problem rather than a deal-breaker. The statement, made as diplomatic talks between Washington and Tehran enter what both sides describe as a decisive stretch, puts the international nuclear watchdog on record that the mechanics of uranium removal are within reach — even if the politics are not.

The 440kg stockpile sits at the heart of the negotiations. At 60 percent enrichment, the material is a short technical step from weapons-grade levels above 90 percent. Any agreement that leaves the stockpile inside Iran would face resistance from Washington, Israel, and much of the international community. Grossi’s assessment that physical transfer is feasible removes one argument against a deal but leaves the harder question untouched: whether Tehran is willing to let the material go.

Trump predicts agreement within a week

President Donald Trump told ABC News on Monday that negotiations with Iran are “looking good” and that a deal to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz could be reached “over the next week.” He said he has not yet approved a memorandum of understanding on reopening the strait, suggesting key terms remain unresolved even as the administration projects optimism.

The timeline is aggressive. As of Sunday, Trump had sent a revised and toughened proposal back to Tehran that widened the gap between the two sides on nuclear enrichment, verification mechanisms, and Hormuz transit language. Iran’s negotiating team had not formally responded to that draft, and the regime’s public statements over the weekend pointed to hardening positions rather than convergence.

Trump’s one-week prediction should be read against the backdrop of 94 days of conflict, at least three rounds of rejected or revised proposals, and a Strait of Hormuz that the IRGC continues to operate as a controlled-access chokepoint rather than an international waterway. Markets and negotiating partners have learned to discount the administration’s timeline projections while taking its substantive positions seriously.

The uranium math

Grossi’s “difficult but not impossible” framing carries technical weight. Moving 440kg of enriched uranium hexafluoride or oxide requires specialized containers, transport security arrangements, and a receiving state willing to accept the material — typically Russia, which has served as the repository for Iranian enriched uranium under previous agreements including the 2015 JCPOA.

The logistics are well understood. Under the JCPOA, Iran shipped the bulk of its enriched stockpile to Russia, retaining only 300kg of material enriched to no more than 3.67 percent. The current stockpile is both larger in quantity and dramatically higher in enrichment level, meaning the security and handling requirements are more demanding. But the precedent exists, and the IAEA has supervised similar transfers before.

The political question is whether Iran would agree to ship the material out rather than blend it down domestically — a process that would keep the uranium on Iranian soil in a lower-enrichment form but would not satisfy hardliners in Washington and Jerusalem who want the material physically removed from Iranian control. Grossi’s statement suggests the IAEA would support and verify either approach, but the diplomatic preference in Washington is clear: get the uranium out of the country.

Iran links talks to Lebanon

Even as the uranium track showed a narrow opening, Iran’s Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that continued Israeli attacks in Lebanon could suspend the dialogue entirely. In a call with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Ghalibaf said any agreement must include a cessation of attacks on all fronts — a condition that effectively asks Washington to deliver Israeli military restraint as part of the price of a deal.

Ghalibaf explicitly linked the US dialogue to developments in Lebanon, warning that “Israeli crimes” in Lebanon could affect the entire negotiating process. The linkage is not new — Iran’s Foreign Minister made similar statements over the weekend — but Ghalibaf’s direct engagement on the point as chief negotiator elevates it from diplomatic signaling to a formal precondition.

Tehran had already halted its indirect message exchange with the US over Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs. The pattern is clear: Iran is treating the Lebanon front and the nuclear-Hormuz track as a single negotiation, and it will not close one while the other remains open.

Hormuz recovery in doubt

Separate from the diplomatic track, new reporting from OilPrice suggests the economic damage from the Hormuz disruption may outlast any agreement. Energy envoy Amos Hochstein was quoted saying Iran will control the strait “for the foreseeable future,” and major oil companies warned that a supply shortage could materialize within weeks if current transit volumes persist.

The assessment aligns with what the IRGC’s daily transit counts have shown: throughput through Hormuz is running at a fraction of pre-conflict levels, with 15 vessels transiting in a recent 24-hour period compared to the 60-to-80-vessel daily norm before the conflict began. Even a signed deal would not immediately restore normal traffic. Tanker rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, elevated war-risk insurance premiums, and degraded port infrastructure have created structural costs that will take months to unwind.

What comes next

The next few days will test whether Grossi’s technical assessment and Trump’s timeline optimism can coexist with Iran’s Lebanon precondition. The three elements pull in different directions: the IAEA says uranium transfer is doable, Trump says a deal is close, and Iran says it will walk away if Israeli attacks in Lebanon continue.

For a deal to land within Trump’s one-week window, at least two things would need to happen simultaneously: Iran would need to decouple the Lebanon front from the nuclear track, and Washington would need to accept a uranium disposition plan — whether removal or blend-down — that Tehran can sell domestically as something other than capitulation. Grossi’s statement makes the technical case that both paths are open. Whether the political will exists on either side to walk through them is a different question, and the answer from Tehran so far has been conditional at best.

Day 94 of the conflict ended with more diplomatic language than diplomatic progress — a pattern that oil traders, if not optimists, have learned to price accordingly.