The September 24 Test: What China Can Deliver on Hormuz

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s September 16 visit to Beijing placed the most consequential question in Middle East diplomacy squarely before China: Can Beijing convert its stated desire for a Hormuz settlement into real leverage on Tehran before Xi Jinping meets President Trump in Washington on September 24?

The answer, based on what analysts and Chinese officials have publicly said, is constrained by what Washington is prepared to offer in return — and by the limits of Chinese influence over an Iranian security establishment that has continued operations independent of its own foreign ministry’s signals.

What Beijing Said

In talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 16, Araghchi received an unambiguous message. Wang urged “all parties to take effective measures to reopen the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible” and called on Tehran and Washington to “engage in substantive consultations on issues of mutual concern,” according to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National News reported that Wang pressed the Hormuz issue directly, underscoring Beijing’s economic stake in restoring transit.

The visit, confirmed by the Chinese foreign ministry on September 15, was framed as routine bilateral diplomacy. Its timing was not. Xi is scheduled to arrive in Washington on September 24 for a meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly — the highest-level US-China encounter since the conflict began in February.

Araghchi has publicly stated that Iran has no interest in prolonging the conflict. But Tehran’s diplomatic posture and its IRGC’s operational tempo in the Strait have remained visibly disconnected throughout the war, complicating any reading of Iran’s actual bargaining position.

China’s Economic Exposure

Beijing’s interest in resolving the Hormuz crisis is not principally diplomatic — it is structural. China is among the world’s largest importers of Gulf crude, and the effective closure of the strait to normal commercial traffic since February has disrupted supply chains and contributed to a sustained global price surge. Brent crude has traded above $100 per barrel in recent weeks, revisiting levels last seen in May.

Goldman Sachs has warned that Brent could rise above $120 per barrel in 2027 if Gulf crude output remains 4 million barrels per day below pre-war levels, with more intense shipping attacks in Hormuz and the Red Sea cited as the most likely driver of that scenario, according to the bank’s oil research team. That is a risk Beijing’s leadership has every incentive to mitigate.

The economic damage extends beyond energy. The defense-sector rally — Lockheed Martin and RTX have surged substantially since the conflict began — reflects a market pricing in continued war, not resolution. A credible diplomatic breakthrough would test that pricing immediately. But the broader oil and shipping disruption is the channel through which the conflict most directly damages Chinese economic output.

The Leverage Question

Whether China’s leverage over Iran is as large as Washington hopes is genuinely uncertain. Beijing has backed Tehran politically throughout the conflict, characterizing the US-Israel campaign as a sovereignty violation and calling for ceasefire and negotiations. Abandoning that posture at Washington’s request would be a significant diplomatic reversal — and Iran would know it.

The IRGC has continued naval interdiction operations in the Strait even during periods when Araghchi and other Iranian civilian officials signaled openness to dialogue. That gap between the foreign ministry’s posture and the IRGC’s operations was one of the fault lines that contributed to the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum framework. The memorandum, signed by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in June following Pakistan-brokered talks, set a 60-day window for negotiations on Hormuz administration, Iran’s nuclear program, and sanctions. It expired unextended on August 17, and the Trump administration halted direct contacts the following day.

No successor framework has been agreed. Oman’s mediation efforts have also stalled. The absence of any active diplomatic channel means Wang Yi’s appeal to Araghchi is the closest thing to a functioning back-channel currently operating between Washington’s interests and Tehran’s decision-makers.

What Trump Will Ask — and What It Will Cost

Trump is expected to press Xi on Iranian restraint in the Strait and on Chinese willingness to back stronger international pressure on Tehran. But Al Jazeera’s analysis from the first Trump-Xi summit in May identified the same constraint that is likely to operate on September 24: meaningful Chinese help on Iran will probably require US concessions on trade, technology transfer restrictions, or security issues in the Asia-Pacific. None of those concessions are politically uncomplicated for the Trump administration.

The UNGA setting provides diplomatic cover for both leaders. A joint statement would be significant. A more likely outcome is a private understanding — perhaps that Beijing will press Tehran to accept an interim shipping arrangement or a new ceasefire framework, in exchange for US assurances on unrelated bilateral issues. Such a deal would be difficult to verify and easy to walk back, but it would give both sides something to announce.

The Outlook

Seven months into the conflict, the Brent crude chart above $100 is the clearest single indicator of how much the global economy still needs a settlement. China feels that pressure directly. But Beijing’s ability to translate economic interest into Iranian compliance depends on factors outside its control: IRGC institutional politics, the terms Trump is willing to accept, and whether a framework can be constructed that Tehran can present domestically as something other than capitulation.

Araghchi left Beijing with public assurances that Iran does not want war to continue. Whether Xi carries a more concrete message to Washington on September 24 — and whether Trump is prepared to pay the price China is likely to set — will determine whether the summit produces movement or only another round of statements.

The diplomatic calendar has now aligned more favorably than at any point since the Islamabad Memorandum expired. The question is whether the political will to use it exists on both sides of the Pacific.